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More on: “Doctors Must Be Healers” ∗
Stephen N. Xenakis, M.D. ∗ ∗
It is a great privilege to host this session and to welcome such a
distinguished panel and guests. I wish to commend Mr. Denbeaux
and his staff for organizing this important event and keeping the
spotlight on the policies and ethical principles that lie behind our
current military engagements. The timely publication of Bob Woodward’s State of Denial has inspired a number of side pieces on the culture of the senior military officers and the propriety of their challenge to the direction and guidance of our civilian leadership—either
within the corridors of the Pentagon or publicly. There are many examples of the unhappy consequences of the tension between decisions made by the civilian leadership and the difficulty of implementing these changes by those who have made the military a career. But
nowhere in the system can the consequences be measured more dramatically in human suffering than in the area of military medicine,
and the practices and policies of military health professionals. As a
retired Brigadier General, a medical doctor, psychiatrist, and someone who organized military medical support for the first Gulf War, I
have sustained a special interest throughout the years, and particularly during our engagement in Iraq.
The publicity surrounding Abu Ghraib in 2004 and
Guantánamo, even today, has raised serious questions about the actions or, more to the point, the apparent inaction of medical personnel at both of these facilities. Over time, more reports have been
published on the participation of health professionals in interrogations, treatment of detainees in hunger strikes, and deaths during incarcerations. It is becoming apparent that contemporary notions of
∗

See Robert Jay Lifton & Stephen N. Xenakis, Editorial, Doctors Must Be Healers,
Not Interrogators; The Pentagon Forces Mental Health Professionals to Betray the Hippocratic
Oath, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at B17.
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Dr. Xenakis, a psychiatrist in private practice, retired from the U.S. Army at the
rank of Brigadier General and is an Adviser to Physicians for Human Rights. This
article is adapted from the author’s remarks at the Guantánamo Teach-In at the
Seton Hall University School of Law on October 5, 2006.
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national security trumped historic traditions of medical ethics and
the overriding responsibilities of the health practitioners in times of
war. We have witnessed the insidious proposition that brutalizing a
few prisoners is a small price to pay for defending the country. According to this line of reasoning, military medical personnel should
put a higher priority on fighting the war against terrorism than on
abiding by the recognized ethical and moral principles of their profession.
That is not how military physicians have been trained. Military
doctors have long been proud of the privilege of serving their nation
and giving care to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who defend it and
its values. As military medical officers, they have taken an oath to the
Constitution and the founding principles for which it stands—that we
understand that this is a nation of laws and that we have respect for
human dignity. Therefore, there has been no conflict for military
medics because they have supported the same underlying values and
principals that founded this great nation and that have guided them
as healers.
Last year, a group of retired senior officers sent letters to the
Congress and the President in support of the McCain Amendment
and spoke out against torture and unconventional practices in the interrogation of prisoners. They affirmed historic principles that
“[t]he abuse of prisoners hurts America’s cause in the war on terror,
endangers U.S. service members who might be captured by the enemy, and is anathema to the values Americans have held dear for
1
generations.”
Furthermore, these senior leaders emphasized that it is “apparent that the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo and
elsewhere took place in part because our men and women in uniform
were given ambiguous instructions, which in some cases authorized
treatment that went beyond what was allowed by the Army Field
2
Manual.”
As one general officer put it, “[i]t is very clear that cruel treatment of detainees became a common Army practice because generals
3
and colonels and majors allowed it to occur, even encouraged it.”

1

Public letter from General Joseph Hoar, U.S.M.C. (Ret.) et al., to Senator John
McCain (Oct. 3, 2005), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
news/2005/10/051003-letter-to-sen-mccain.htm.
2
Id.
3
HINA SHAMSI, COMMAND’S RESPONSIBILITY: DETAINEE DEATHS IN U.S. CUSTODY IN
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN (Deborah Pearstein ed., Human Rights First, February 2006),
available at http://www.human rightsfirst.org
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There is a basic rule: the commander is responsible for what the soldiers do and do not do. In other words, commanders are responsible
for the ethical and moral climate of their units.
There is no escaping that the responsibility for the conduct of
the medics at Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib rests with the senior
leadership of the medical departments. Since the onset of combat in
both Afghanistan and Iraq, the leadership has faced difficult challenges regarding the appropriate conduct of medical personnel in
the treatment of detainees, the way medics handle casualties and
deaths of prisoners, and the response to hunger strikes and other
medical emergencies in the detention facilities. Historically, detention facilities have fully staffed clinics with primary care physicians,
nurses, and a host of other support personnel who are supposed to
treat American soldiers as well as detainees. The rule has been that
soldiers, POWs, and detainees are entitled to the same standard of
care. The common duty—from corpsmen with basic medical skills
training to the most experienced surgeon—has been to provide care
according to the highest standards of medical practice to all who
need it and, of course, to report any signs of physical or psychological
abuse. Medical officers have enjoyed special privileges and status and
have been expected to abide by, and stand up for, their professional
principles at all times and in all situations.
The responsibility and authority for the policies and practices
guiding healthcare delivery rest with the military medical leadership,
and this ultimate responsibility can be neither deferred nor side4
stepped. Each military service—Army, Air Force, and Navy —has a
separate medical department that is headed by its own Surgeon General, a three-star officer. All health professionals belong to those
medical departments and wear the respective insignia of their
branch—either medical corps, medical service corps, or medical specialist corps. It is difficult to underestimate the importance of these
branch insignia; even as general officers, most health professional officers wear their branch insignia unlike general officers in the combat
arms or combat support branches. All physicians—M.D.s and
D.O.s—who are licensed to practice medicine must belong to the
medical branch. To find an exception to this, one must go back to
the nineteenth century and the story of General Leonard Wood,
awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor for valor while commanding an infantry detachment, and the only medical officer to
4

The Navy medical department provides medical support to the Marines. DEBUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY, MANUAL OF THE MEDICAL
P-117, 3 (1994) (Change 109).
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have served as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Similar rules govern
chaplains, but not necessarily lawyers.
The regulations for psychologists and other doctoral-level health
professionals are different. For example, if an officer with a doctorate in psychology wishes to practice as a clinician, then the officer is
“branched” in the medical department and abides by the ethics and
policies of the health professions. Other officers—such as infantryman, military police, or interrogators—may earn psychology doctorates but not practice as clinicians. These officers serve in their respective branches and roles and are expected to conform to the
regulations of their professional colleagues. All officers assigned to
the medical departments of the military services are expected to fulfill the guidelines and codes that come with being a healing practitioner and wearing the insignia of a health professional.
While these differences may appear to be small bureaucratic distinctions, the singular identity of the medical corps goes to the heart
of the treatment and handling of detainees, and the serious lapses
that have followed. First, consider the grim record of these lapses.
Human Rights First reported in February 2006 that ninety-eight detainees died in American custody and proposed that there had been
5
eight to twelve deaths that followed acts of torture. A recent report
by the Physicians for Human Rights (“PHR”) confirmed 105 deaths in
6
Iraq and Afghanistan from 2002 to 2005. Homicide accounted for
forty-three enemy deaths followed by thirty-six deaths attributed to
7
mortar attacks. PHR found that autopsies were not required for
deaths in custody, in a departure from usual policy, and there were
no “full and adequate records” of treatment or documentation of the
8
incidents.
The timeliness and delivery of emergency resuscitation are unclear from the available records. Aggressive techniques, including
dietary manipulation, stress positions, isolation, and environmental
factors such as extremes of heat and cold used in the interrogation of
detainees, imposed further burdens on the medical departments and
obfuscated the comprehensive reviews and investigations they have
conducted. Each fatality should have been handled with special at-

5

SHAMSI, supra note 3, at 5 n.2.
SCOTT A. ALLEN, JOSIAH D. RICH, MPH, ROBERT C. BUX, BASSINA FARBENBLUM,
MATT BERNS & LEONARD RUBENSTEIN, DEATHS OF DETAINEES IN THE CUSTODY OF U.S.
FORCES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN FROM 2002 TO 2005 (Dec. 5, 2006),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/547787 (registration webpage only).
7
Id.
8
Id.
6
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tention. The absence of evidence is astonishing, including missing
body parts of deceased prisoners needed for autopsies in some cases.
Special effort should have been exercised to ensure the highest quality care for detainees, and any indication of problems in delivering
that care or suspicion of maltreatment should have been investigated
in depth.
Adding to the problems, the Department of Defense introduced
Behavior Science Consultation Teams (“BSCTs”) in Guantánamo and
Abu Ghraib, starting in 2002, to support interrogations. Military
health care personnel, including psychiatrists and psychologists, assisted in questioning detainees. Doctors were asked to approve, and
even monitor, interrogation plans at Abu Ghraib relying on sleep
deprivation. A report issued by The Surgeon General of the U.S.
Army in 2005 acknowledged that military psychiatrists and psychologists on BSCTs were involved in the design, approval, and monitoring
9
of interrogations. Army interrogators, The Surgeon General reported, were instructed to consult regularly with the BSCTs regarding
detainees’ medical histories, and to focus on vulnerabilities such as
depression, delusional behaviors, manifestations of stress, and deter10
mining “what are their buttons.” Interrogators were advised to rely
on BSCT personnel’s knowledge of “when to push or not push
11
harder in the pursuit of intelligence information.”
Recognizing that any interrogation is inherently coercive, participation by mental health professionals directly conflicts with acceptable ethical roles and should be forbidden altogether. Even in
the mildest interrogation, the subject is deliberately put under stress,
anxiety is intentionally heightened, fears and concerns are exploited,
and facts are manipulated. A person is put on edge, perhaps confused, and is often lied to. There is no circumstance for healers to
become involved in interrogations, except to treat and support subjects who are suffering from disease and injury. In all respects, there
is a bright line between “healing” and “interrogating.”
It should be noted, though, that psychologists who are branched
as military intelligence officers, police, or infantryman, can find legitimate ways to participate in interrogations. Often, the public does
not distinguish between psychiatrists (M.D.s) and psychologists
(Ph.D.s or Psy.D.s) and lumps them all together as mental health
9

DEPT. OF ARMY, OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, FINAL REPORT, ASSESSMENT OF
DETAINEE MEDICAL OPERATIONS FOR OEF, GTMO AND OIF (Apr. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/detmedopsrprt/detmedopsrpt.pdf.
10
Id.
11
Id.

XENAKISFINAL

708

4/9/2007 11:37:06 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:703

specialists. There are, however, significant differences in training
and responsibilities in the military and the private sector. Psychiatrists are physicians who hold a medical degree and live by the ethical
principles and regulations that govern all doctors, without exception.
In the military, psychiatrists are often expected to act as primary care
physicians as well—stop the bleeding and do C.P.R. before, for instance, asking about the patient’s mother.
On the other hand, psychologists hold either Ph.D.s in psychology, education, or counseling, or they hold Psy.D.s, doctorates of psychology. They are governed by different rules and regulations from
physicians and some have earned graduate degrees as part of their
professional training as interrogators or infantryman. These psychologists, who are not assigned to medical branches, are not authorized to perform any healthcare functions nor to act in any way that
could be construed as having a clinician-patient relationship. They
wear the insignia of their parent branch and follow career paths that
are different from traditional healthcare providers. They have their
own professional rules and guidelines—those of the combat arms and
combat support branches. Even so, they do not have the license to be
freewheeling cowboys. They are obligated to be cognizant of, and
abide by, all accepted practices, conventions, and laws in carrying out
their duties, including the Geneva Conventions. There is no room
for harsh, inhuman, or degrading treatment. The experience of
working interrogators (military intelligence officers), some with training and background in psychology, bears this out. A number have
reported to me that they find harsh and punitive tactics abhorrent
and counterproductive, and damaging to their professional identity
and state of mind. These officers speak forthrightly and confirm that
witnessing such tactics harms them and degrades the effectiveness of
the interrogations.
The stories about the treatment and handling of detainees on
hunger strikes are particularly disturbing. In the nearly five years
since the first detainee arrived at Guantánamo, several hundred have
participated in hunger strikes at one time or another and three have
committed suicide. The policies of the commanding authorities are
generally stern and punitive. A year ago, the military introduced “the
12
chair” to “break the hunger strike[s].” The “specifically designed
chair” has been used to strap prisoners down and feed them by na-

12

George J. Annas, Hunger Strikes at Guantanamo—Medical Ethics and Human
Rights in a “Legal Black Hole,” 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377 (2006).
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sogastric tubes. The prisoners are bound for two to three hours after feeding to prevent them from vomiting or otherwise expelling
14
their stomach contents. It has been also reported that the prisoners
are subjected to forced ingestion of laxatives and diuretics, as well as
15
other stresses.
The U.S. Department of Defense (“DoD”) argues
that the “individuals in this situation do not meet the ethical criteria
16
for self-determination” and so can be fed against their will. On the
other hand, the medical leadership has not implemented procedures
for ascertaining if the detainees are competent to decide whether
they wish to be fed, if they suffer from illnesses or circumstances that
unduly influence their decisions, or if they have been given the right
to have a second opinion of outside examiners who review their cases.
These detainees are not all simply engaging in “asymmetrical war17
fare,” as command authorities have asserted, and there is no one
story that explains each detainee’s decision to embark upon a hunger
strike. The conditions of incarceration at the detention facilities illustrate that our military healthcare system has not taken all possible
measures to prevent a downward spiral into a hopeless and helpless
state for those men held captive—to the point that self-starvation
seems like a reasonable alternative to the suffering. Each detainee
deserves individual attention, in the interest of protecting their lives
and health, in the best traditions of excellent medical care.
One senior general, while still on active duty, remarked in a private discussion that the military had to scramble and adjust to personnel shortfalls with the multiple demands of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and took actions that may seem ill-advised or
questionable in retrospect. Perhaps, but the policies and practice
guidance of the DoD have started our military down a slippery slope.
We should not endorse the notion that our leadership, military or civilian, can change the rules just because this is “a state of war.” Military medics, especially, must abide by the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics, and apply the highest standards of
medical practice to all who need it, including prisoners, and report
13

See Tim Golden, Tough U.S. Steps on Hunger Strike at Camp in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2006, at A1.
14
Id.
15

Andrew Sullivan, How Doctors Got into the Torture Business, TIME, June 23,
2006, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1207633,00.
html.
16
Letter from John S. Edmondson, M.D., Captain, U.S. Navy, Force Surgeon JTF GTMO, to Dr. D.J. Nicholl, Dec. 12, 2005 (on file with author).
17
Josh White, Three Detainees Commit Suicide at Guantanamo, WASH. POST,
June 11, 2006, at A1.
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any signs of physical or psychological abuse. Surely senior military
medics faced tough decisions and determined leadership when preparing for war and in the ensuing conflicts. Nonetheless, they should
have first asked the hard questions about the ethical parameters guiding the conduct of medics, and focused on the policies that governed
that conduct: what is the historical precedent; what are the best ideas
about the role of medics in this war; and what are the long-term consequences of their actions? Now they confront even more of a burden—returning to some of the old and important values of the past,
while repairing the recent damage to morale and reputation that the
military has suffered.

